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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
\T_A. UGHN L. \\rARR, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

vs.

THE \'""_A_N KLEECK-BACON
INVEST:JIENT COMPANY, and
THE \-.-AN KLEECK MORTGAGE
COMPANY,
Defendants and Appellants,
JAY LARSE.N,
Appellant and Intervener.

Case No.

7872

REPLY BRIEF OF: DEFENDANTS.
AND APPELLANTS
AND

JAY LARSEN, APPELLANT AND
INTERVENER
POINT I.
BOTH VAN KLEECK COMPANIES WERE QUALIFIED
TO DO BUSINESS IN UTAH WHEN THE WARR DEED
WAS ACKNOWLEDGED AND DELIVERED TO THE VAN
KLEECK-BACON INVESTMENT COMPANY.

Plaintiffs and respondents in their brief dwell upon
the corporate status over the years of the Van Kleeck
Companies both in Utah and Colorado and, although
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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they do not come right out and say so, are apparently
attempting to convey the impression that when the
vVarr Deed was delivered neither company was qualified
to transact business in Utah. This impression 1s contrary to the facts.
The Warr Deed (R. 24-5), which on its face states,
"This deed is not intended as a mortgage," was dated
April 19, 1921, acknowledged May 14, 1921, and after
such acknowledgment duly delivered to the Investment
Company and recorded.
At the bottom of page 6 of their brief plaintiffs
state, "The Van Kleeck Mortgage Company qualified
to do business in the State of Utah on the 2nd day of.
May "1921." Again on page 35 of their brief plaintiffs
state that the Investment Company, the Grantee under
the W arr deed, was formed in 1901 for a period of 20
years and that its corporate existence expired in 1921
just a few months after the takilng of the purported deed
which was in fact only a. mortgage.
The fact is, therefore, and cannot be denied that on
the date the Warr deed was acknowledged and delivered
to the Investment Company both of the Van Kle.eck
Companies were in good standing and duly qualified to
transact business in Utah.
POINT II.
PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT
JAY LARSEN IS NOT A NECESSARY AND INDISPENSABLE PARTY TO THIS ACTION.

F'rom page 37 to page 48, with a significant absence
of le~gal authorities, plaintiffs argue that Jay Larsen is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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3
not a necessary and indispensable party to this action
and that his title has not been clouded for the reason
that he is a bona fide purchaser for value of the surface
rights and 'vater stock involved in this action.
On pages 39 and 40 plaintiffs cite Jones on Mortgages, Glen on lllortgages, two Ne·w York cases and
one \V- ashington case, holding that Jay Larsen, as a
bona fide purchaser for value, might take free and clear
of a Court decree adjudging the W arr deed to be an
equitable mortgage. These authorities may be of some
value in assisting Jay Larsen to prevail over plaintiffs
but they do not show that he is disp·ensable or that his
record title is still free and clear.
We first point out that Jay Larsen's title has definitely been clouded by the judgment of the court below
and because he holds under a warranty deed from the
defaulting defendant, The Van Kleeck-Bacon Investment Company, is entitled under the authorities to
intervene in the action. An abstract of title of the property would now show two owners of the water stock and
surface rights, Jay Larsen and plaintiffs.
In the court below plaintiffs asked for a judgment
clouding Jay Larsen's title and they got it. It is now
too late for them to say, having gotten it, that they
didn't want it in the first place. Plaintiffs' recorded
judgment speaks louder than plaintiffs' unrecorded brief.
Jay Larsen has the right to intervene here and have
that judgment removed as a cloud on his title.
We next point out tha.t plaintiffs' contention that
Jay Larsen, as a bona fide purchaser, took free and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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clear of the so-called infirmities of the deed absolute
from the W arrs to the Van Kleeck Companies is directly
contrary to the holding of this Court in First National
Bank of Price vs. Parker, 57 Utah 290, 194 Pac. 661,
12 A.L.R. 1373.
The attention of the Court is directed to the fact
that the court below, in paragraph 2 of its judgment,
decreed tha.t the W arr deed was not only an outlawed
mortgage but also, in paragraph 4, decreed that the
purported mortgage and conV'eyance to the Van Kleeck
Companies was absolutely "void" because the companies
were not qualified to do business in Utah. In this connection we refer to Dunn vs. Utah Serum Co., 65 Utah
527, 238 Pac. 245, which held that a mortgage taken in
Utah by a non-qualified foreign corporation was absolutely void in an action brought to foreclose the same.
The decision of the court in the Serum case was largely
based upon the prior holding of this court in the Parker
case referred to above. The. Parker case held that a
bona fide transferee for value and holder in due course,
whether by delivery or endorsement of a note payable
to bearer, could not enforce such note against the maker
of the note notwithstanding the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act where the payee of the. note was
a corporation not properly qualified to transact business
in Utah. The Court held that the note was wholly
void, not only in the hands of the: non-qualified corporation payee itself, but also in the hands of its assignee
or anyone deriving any interest or title therein from
such non-qualified corporation.
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The Court stated:
HThe language of the act is not only that the
contract shall be wholly void in the hands of
the corporation and its assigns, but it goes farther
than any of the other statutes relied upon, in
that it makes the contract void in the hands of
anyone obtaining any right or title through or
from such non-complying corporation."
The Court below having decreed the conveyance
from the W arrs to the Investment Company to be absolutely void, Jay Larsen could get no better title to the
surface rights and water stock from the Investment
Company than he could get to cattle purchased for value
without notice from a thief.
POINT III.
PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO SHOW THAT DEFENDANTS HAVE NO MERITORIOUS DEFENSE.

It is, of course, elementary that the merits of the
case are not to be tried on a motion to set aside a
default judgment. All that is necessary is that the
Court satisfy itself that the defendant has on supporting affidavits a meritorious defense and interposes an
answer which if true would constitute a defense to plaintiffs' claim.
Upon a trial of the case we will show that the
original note executed by the W arrs to the Mortgage
Company was a Denver note, payable, effected, delivered,
and to be performed in D·enver. In extinguishment of
this debt, and not to secure any other or different debt,
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the W arrs deeded the property by Warranty Deed to
the Investment Company at the request of the Mortgage
Con1pany. It is not unusual for a creditor to take property from his debtor in extinguishment of the debt and
to direct the debtor to convey the property to some
designated third person. The reason why the Mortgage
Company requested the W arrs to deed the property to
the Investment Company was to keep the mortgages on
the property intact and prevent their common law me~r
ger. It hoped eventually to find another purchaser of the
land who might assume the mortgages.
On pages 29 and 30 of plaintiffs' brief much point
is n1ade of the Dunn v. Utah Serum Co. case. In that
case (see page 541 of opinion) both note and mortgage_
"were made and entered into and by their terms are to
be performed within this state" at a time when the
mortgagee was not properly qualified but was in fact
engaged in doing business in Utah. In the ca.se at bar
the note, as heretofore pointed out, was a Denver note,
payable, effected, and to be performed in Denver. We
likewise emphatically deny and on a trial will prove,
if the point is relevant at all, that the mortgage company was not doing business at the time the original
mortgages were exeeuted so as to attach any infirmities
against such mortgages. In any event and notwithstanding that the Court below in error declared the Warr
conveyance void, the Dwnn case is not applicable to the
case at bar for the reason that the mortgage company
as mortgagee did not and never has come into the· Courts
of Utah to foreclose its mortgages against the Warrs.
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The Serlun case, altl1ough holding a mortgage void when
the non-qualifying foreign corporation comes into the
Courts of this State to foreclose its mortgage, never
has been held to prevent a mortgagor from voluntarily
recogniZing his obligation and paying his debt voluntarily.
POINT IV.
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE DEED
ABSOLUTE FROM THE WARRS SHOULD BE CONSTRUED
AS A MORTGAGE.

On page 32, plaintiffs' refer to the case of Bybee v.
Stt(;a.rt, 112 Utah 462, 189 Pac. (2) 118. This case; merely
held that a deed absolute should be construed as a mortgage where it is shown that the deed was given to secure
a debt. This law is also expressed in Brow·n vs. Skeen,
89 Utah 568, 58 Pac. (2) 24, and in Duerden vs. Solomon,
33 Utah 468, 94 Pac. 978.
As heretofore pointed ·out, this doctrine is completely inapplicable to the case at bar for the simple
reason that the Warranty Deed from the W arrs to the
Investment Company was given, not to secure a debt,
but to extinguish an antecedent debt owing from the
W arrs to the Mortgage Company. The case at har, we
respectfully submit, is governed by the decision of this
Court in Thornley Land and Livestock Co. v. Gailey,
105 Utah 519, 143 Pac. (2) 283. The omission of this
case in plaintiffs' brief is significant. In the Thornley
case this Court held that a deed absolute accompanied by
an agreement to redeem or buy the land back within
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one year should be construed, not as a mortgage, but as
a conditional_ sale, where it appears, among other things,
that the deed was given to extinguish an earlier indebtedness evidenced by mortgage. The Court stated :
"He already had a mortgage, so what would
be gained by a deed absolute if· it were to be
construed as an equitable mortgage and require
foreclosure."
F·or other cases on this point, we refer the· Court
to 79 A.L.R. 937 and the~ annotation contained therein
entitled, "Deed absolute on its face, with contemporaneous agreement for option for re-purchase by Grantor
as a mortgage vel non."
Respectfully submitted,
C. M. GILMOUR,
FRANK A. JOHNSON,
DEY, HOPP AUGH, MARK &
JOHNSON,
Attorneys for Defend(}Jnts
and Appellants,
903 Kearns Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
CLYDE s.. JOHNSON,
Attorney for JAY LARSEN,
A p·p-ell(JJYt.t and I nter·vene:r,
Vernal, Utah.
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